Experts believe the catastrophic implosion of the Titan submersible, which tragically killed all five passengers during its journey to the Titanic shipwreck, likely resulted in instantaneous death due to the extreme water pressure, a devastating outcome feared during the search.
The Titan submersible, owned by OceanGate Expeditions, measured 22 feet long and weighed 23,000 pounds, featuring a larger interior that, while still tight for five people, subjected it to immense external pressure at the Titanic wreck site, which is about 400 times the atmospheric pressure at sea level.
The implosion of the Titan submersible has drawn attention to questions about its design and the creator’s reported refusal to adhere to industry-standard safety checks. OceanGate Expeditions first began taking individuals to the Titanic site in 2021. The company promoted the Titan’s construction, which included a carbon fiber composite hull and an elongated chamber for passengers, as a departure from traditional spherical cabins and all-titanium construction, touting it as “lighter in weight and more efficient to mobilize than other deep diving submersible.”
Concerns have surfaced regarding the Titan’s unconventional design, particularly its elongated tube shape, which contrasts with the spherical cabins typical in submersibles for equal pressure distribution, and the use of carbon composites, a material not usually subjected to such external forces, which experts liken to applying ‘aviation thinking to a deep submergence engineering problem’.
A critical issue pointed out by critics is the lack of certification by outside experts or a “classing bureau.” Bob Ballard, a member of the research team that discovered the Titanic wreck in 1985, referred to this lack of certification as “the smoking gun” in the Titan case. He noted that despite thousands of dives to similar depths by other certified submarines without incident, this is the first time such a tragedy has occurred with a non-classed submarine. Titanic director James Cameron echoed this sentiment, calling the lack of certification “a critical failure.”
Stockton Rush, the CEO of OceanGate Expeditions and pilot of the Titan, who was among those lost, reportedly disliked industry standards, stating he was ‘tired of industry players who try to use a safety argument to stop innovation’ and wished to be remembered as an innovator who broke rules ‘with logic and good engineering behind me’.
The five people aboard the Titan submersible were British billionaire Hamish Harding, aged 58, OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, aged 61, prominent Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood, aged 48, his 19-year-old son, Sulaiman Dawood, and French Titanic expert Paul-Henri Nargeolet, aged 77. The expedition began its descent toward the Titanic wreck, situated more than 400 miles off the coast of Newfoundland, on Sunday, June 18.
The submersible lost contact with its surface support vessel about an hour and 45 minutes into its planned two-hour dive to the Titanic wreck, and tragically, debris was later discovered on the seabed roughly 1,600 feet from the Titanic’s bow, indicating it was only about 15 minutes from its destination.
The Titan submersible had undertaken previous successful trips, including dives to 4,000 meters below the surface in the Bahamas. However, the vehicle had reportedly shown signs of cyclic fatigue, indicating wear that suggested it might no longer be able to withstand extreme pressure. Prior to its final expedition to the 3,800-meter deep Titanic wreck, its hull depth rating had reportedly been reduced to 3,000 meters.
Analyzing the recovered debris, experts like Jasper Graham-Jones suggest the carbon-fiber hull likely failed under pressure, as the titanium rings appear intact, leading to the theory that the composite section may have disintegrated into small pieces, supported by the absence of large hull fragments in the imagery.
Another possibility considered by Graham-Jones is that the ship’s small front viewport gave way first. Photos show debris that seems to belong to the front viewport, with nothing remaining in the porthole. While a salvage operation could have removed components, this is deemed less likely. Experts had questioned OceanGate’s choice of front-view window previously; in 2018 court filings, a former employee alleged the viewport was only certified to a depth of about 4,200 feet (1,300 meters), far shallower than the Titanic’s depth. It remains unclear if the design changed, but the viewport was an early concern.
Graham-Jones explained that while both a window failure or a hull failure could lead to implosion, if the viewport went first, the pressure on the hull would have been slightly less intense, potentially resulting in larger pieces of composite material remaining. Given the absence of such large pieces, the carbon fiber hull failing first is considered the most plausible scenario by Graham-Jones. He suggested repeated trips could have stressed the material, creating small cracks that eventually succumbed to the pressure, explaining why earlier dives were successful.
However, Spanish engineer José Luis Martín theorizes that the five individuals on board might have had a terrifying awareness of the impending implosion for 48 to 71 seconds, suggesting an electrical failure at around 5,500 feet could have caused a loss of thrust, leading to a destabilizing shift in weight towards the front.
Martín theorized that at this point, the submersible would begin to fall “headlong” towards the seafloor, with control and safety functions damaged, rendering it maneuverable. He suggested the pilot could not activate the emergency lever designed to drop weights and return to the surface, describing the lever as inadequate for such an emergency. As the Titan potentially changed position and fell vertically due to the weight imbalance, the expert painted a picture of passengers crowding towards the front. He suggested the “horror, the fear, and the agony” they experienced during this free fall, potentially in complete darkness, would have been immense as they realized the seriousness of the situation.
According to Martín’s theory, as the vessel fell, the hull would have been subjected to a sudden increase in pressure, leading to “powerful compression” around 9,000 feet. He suggested the rapid contraction of the carbon-fiber hull, potentially out of step with the acrylic of the viewport, could have led to a micro-fissure and subsequent implosion. His report suggests the implosion and instantaneous death occurred after this 48 to 71 second period of free fall. While other experts described the death as instantaneous *upon implosion*, Martín’s theory suggests a preceding period of terrifying awareness due to a cascade of failures.
Structural hull issues are a prime suspect, with ocean engineering professor Stefano Brizzolara noting that carbon fiber’s propensity for defects and ‘fragile behavior’ makes it susceptible to failure under pressure, where even a minor leak could cause a high-speed water influx and immediate fatality.
The immense search effort for the submersible involved the U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy, and other agencies and private entities, incurring significant costs. Experts estimate the cost for the U.S. Coast Guard alone will easily stretch into the millions of dollars. The Pentagon has calculated the hourly cost of operating aircraft used in the search, such as P-3 Orion, P-8 Poseidon, and C-130 Hercules, at tens of thousands of dollars. While some agencies may seek reimbursement, federal law generally prohibits the U.S. Coast Guard from recovering costs for search and rescue services.
Mikki Hastings, president and CEO of the National Association for Search and Rescue, emphasized that search and rescue operations prioritize saving lives regardless of cost, assuring that agencies are budgeted for such missions and that no one in distress should hesitate to seek help, as ‘Every person who is missing – they deserve to be found.’
The Titan’s ill-fated expedition underscores the unregulated nature of deep-sea exploration, especially in international waters, where the vessel operated beyond the scope of most national laws and lacked registration or classification by industry bodies that set crucial safety standards for deep-sea craft.
