It’s been a year since the heartbreaking Titan submersible disaster, a tragedy that still weighs heavily on our minds. On June 18, 2023, five men set out for the Titanic wreck deep in the Atlantic, a journey that tragically became their last. The world held its breath during a massive search, hoping the submersible had simply lost communication and could still resurface.
Those hopes flickered when rhythmic banging sounds were detected every 30 minutes, but sadly, it was too late. The five souls aboard—OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, billionaire Hamish Harding, Titanic expert Paul-Henri Nargeolet, billionaire Shahzada Dawood, and his son Suleman—perished in a catastrophic ‘implosion’ caused by immense water pressure and material failure during their descent, a devastating event that sent shockwaves globally.
A year on from this devastating event, a series of details have emerged, many highlighted during recent public hearings, suggesting that the Titan submersible, primarily masterminded by Stockton Rush, may have been an ‘accident waiting to happen.’ Evidence points to multiple individuals having reportedly warned Rush about the vessel’s safety.
A major point of concern surrounding the Titan’s design was its unconventional piloting system; many found CEO Stockton Rush’s choice to use a Logitech G F710 Wireless Gamepad, a common video game controller, highly questionable. Rush himself was quoted saying that steering the vessel ‘shouldn’t take a lot of skill,’ a statement that now seems chillingly ironic.
This gamepad, powered by just two AA batteries, struck experts as an alarmingly unreliable choice for such a critical and high-stakes operation. While it’s true that some aircraft, both manned and unmanned, utilize similar devices, aerospace engineering professor Steve Wright emphasized to CBS News that a dedicated steering mechanism would have been infinitely safer, suggesting, ‘I would expect the ‘real’ submersible controller to have a reliability of about one thousand times that of the games handset.’
Beyond the control system, the Titan was notable for its lack of space and comfort, especially considering its intended eight-hour dives to the Titanic wreckage. Measuring just 670cm x 280cm x 250cm, the vessel offered confined quarters for the five men. There were no seats inside, requiring the group to sit on the floor with very limited room for movement.
The conditions were undoubtedly claustrophobic. Passengers were even advised to restrict their diet before and during the dive to “reduce the likelihood that they needed to use the bathroom facilities.” These facilities consisted of a small box used behind a privacy curtain, underscoring the spartan nature of the vessel’s interior.
The choice of materials for the submersible’s hull also sparked considerable debate. The Titan was controversially constructed from carbon fibre, a material some experts regarded as ‘experimental’ for deep-sea use even before the fatal implosion occurred. Research conducted a year later at the University of Houston supported these concerns, suggesting this material choice may have been a fatal error.
Research published in the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) highlighted how imperfections in thin-walled structures, like the Titan’s hull, can lead to severe damage under the extreme pressures of the deep ocean. The study’s lead, Professor Roberto Ballarini, further explained that repeated dives might have weakened the carbon fiber hull, making it more vulnerable to ‘micro-buckling’ under pressure, though the precise cause of the implosion remains officially undetermined.
Additional criticisms were levelled against many of the components used in the sub’s construction, which others described as ‘flimsy and fragile.’ Former Royal Navy admiral Chris Parry remarked that you could acquire most of the materials “from Amazon,” suggesting a perceived lack of high-grade, purpose-built components.
The mental image of the five men in their final moments aboard the Titan is made even more distressing by the conditions inside. With the floodlights and interior lights turned off to conserve battery power, the vessel was intended to be largely in darkness, as explained by Christine Dawood, wife and mother of Shahzada and Suleman, after the tragedy.
Inside the submersible, the only illumination would have likely come from the glow of computer screens, pens used for logging data, and perhaps the eerie light of bioluminescent creatures outside the single viewport. However, CBS journalist David Pogue, who had previously experienced a dive in the Titan, painted a different picture, recalling the interior being lit by ‘camping lights’ and noting the presence of budget security cameras and pipes used for ballast.
Pogue himself confessed to having ‘some qualms’ before his dive, observing that ‘a lot of components were off-the-shelf’ and seemed ‘improvised,’ a sentiment that unfortunately echoed widespread unease about the vessel’s construction and its suitability for deep-sea exploration.
Despite Stockton Rush’s apparent confidence in the June 2023 dive, experts believe he should have paid attention to issues and errors that had occurred on several previous voyages. Arthur Loibl, who dived on the Titan to the Titanic wreck in August 2021, described himself as “incredibly lucky” to have survived, claiming the vessel was “not safe.”
Loibl alleged that his dive was delayed by five hours due to electrical problems before parts of the sub began to crumble off during the descent. YouTuber Alan Estrada experienced another issue during a July 2022 dive when the Titan’s battery life suddenly depleted, forcing the group to abort their voyage and return to the surface prematurely.
Josh Gates, who also visited the Titanic wreckage area in 2021, stated that the sub “did not perform well” during his time onboard. He further claimed that he “walked away from a huge opportunity to film Titanic due to my safety concerns with OceanGate.”
A critical issue that emerged was OceanGate’s decision to bypass the ‘classification’ process by independent inspectors, a standard procedure designed to ensure submersibles meet stringent technical standards. The company, founded by Rush and Guillermo Söhnlein in 2009, explained their reasoning in a 2019 blog post.
OceanGate argued that classification wouldn’t ‘ensure that operators adhere to proper operating procedures and decision-making processes – two areas that are much more important for mitigating risks at sea.’ They also felt that while certifying agencies were open to new designs, their ‘multi-year approval cycle due to a lack of pre-existing standards’ was ‘anathema to rapid innovation.’
Many industry professionals now believe that involving independent bodies to rigorously assess the submersible and verify its seaworthiness could have potentially prevented last year’s tragic outcome, highlighting the significant concerns raised by the absence of this crucial safety measure.
